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Do Bounty Hunters Dream of Black Sheep?: Reading Race into Philip K. Dick 
Joe Street (Northumbria University) 
 
The TV set shouted, ‘ – duplicates the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War 
Southern states! Either as body servants or tireless field hands…. [a] loyal, 
trouble-free companion’ for all settlers. 
‘I think what I and my family of three noticed most of all was the 
dignity… Having a servant you can depend on… I find it reassuring.’ (Dick 
1999: 16-17)  
 
No, not a neo-Confederate promise to secessionists fleeing a multicultural United States and a 
testimony from a happy slave-owner, but a fictional advert promising a robot slave to any 
human prepared to abandon a post-apocalyptic America for a new settlement on Mars, 
backed up with a Martian emigrant extolling the virtues of her robot factotum. Like many of 
Philip K. Dick’s novels, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) offers a philosophical 
exploration of such themes as consciousness, emotion and the nature of humanity. As 
important, it operates as a commentary on the response of slaves to servitude and as a quasi-
slave narrative that sheds light on race relations in the United States. 
Thanks in part to its film adaptation as Blade Runner (1982), Androids has received 
reams of critical analysis. It has been read variously as a ‘meditation on the presence of evil 
in the world’ (Rossi 2011: 170), a defence of empathy (Rhee 2013), an allegory for autism 
(Morton 2015), an interface between humanity and technology (Sims 2009), a study in 
entropy (Palmer 2003) or posthumanity (Galvin 1997), and a critique of either scientific 
racism (McNamara 1997) or ‘speciesism’ (Barr 1997). Yet, despite Darko Suvin’s 
observation that Dick ‘always speaks directly out of and to the American experience of his 
generation’ (Suvin 1975), few have examined Androids through the prism of contemporary 
American race relations. Peter Fitting briefly mentions the possibility that the androids might 
be black (Fitting 1987: 343-4) while Christopher Palmer touches on the novel’s relationship 
with the American Civil War Centennial and the civil rights movement (Palmer 2003: viii). 
This oversight may be because none of the characters are explicitly black, as for example in 
Counter-Clock World (1967) (see also Jakaitis 1995), but it is even more surprising when one 
considers that the novel yokes the condition of the androids to the historical legacy of slavery. 
This reading becomes more complicated if readers also consider the book’s relationship with 
the African American presence in the San Francisco Bay Area, the setting for the novel’s 
action. The specificity of both geographical location and temporal proximity to the lives of its 
readers (the novel is set in a near-future 1992) encourages consideration of the novel’s 
interrogation of contemporary race relations in the city, which itself deepens the novel’s 
construction of space and its presentation of the role of the suburbs amid periods of racial 
turmoil.  
As Gregory Rutledge observes, the science fiction ghetto in which Dick wrote 
suffered from white normative assumptions about society: the futures it imagined reflected 
the predominance of white authors and readers within sf of the 1960s. African Americans, 
meanwhile, were ‘akin to aliens’ (Rutledge 2000: 130). With the exception of the renegade 
leader, Baty, who possesses ‘Mongolian features which gave him a brutal look’ (Dick 1999: 
130), Dick offers no racial description of the androids. Dick plays upon the assumptions of 
his predominantly white readers that the Nexus-6 androids are also white since, on the most 
simplistic level, they look like everybody else. He suggests that market competition for 
androids among settlers led to the creation of the Nexus-6, hinting that human settlers desired 
androids that looked indistinguishable from themselves (Dick 1999: 15; 26). Metonymically 
speaking, however, the androids are black but ‘pass’ for white.1 
In order to uphold this argument and to understand Dick’s relationship with the racial 
politics of his time, his own history prior to the novel’s completion needs evaluation. This 
opens up discussion of the novel’s depiction of racialized characters and race relations, 
leading to the suggestion that the novel renders the reader complicit in the crimes committed 
in the defence of human (white) supremacy. Although Androids is not a ‘civil rights novel’, it 
plays on three themes in African American history. The first is the role of slave insurrections 
in white psychology and the fear of almost superhuman, hyper-violent black men in leading 
such rebellions. Baty can be viewed as a simulacrum of an African American radical leader, 
thus presenting the novel as an expression of white fears of African American insurrection. 
The second stems from the post-bellum period through to the early twentieth century, when 
light-skinned African Americans were able to ‘pass’ as white. The androids’ attempts to pass 
as human underscore the book’s presentation of white fears of black infiltration and of the 
androids’ humanity. The third – the acceleration of urban racial integration in the 1960s – is 
mediated through the novel’s use of physical and colonial spaces that again articulate white 
concerns over integration and collapsing racial boundaries. Here, the novel’s racial subtext 
implicitly questions whether the civil rights legislation of the 1960s offered any changes to 
the material circumstances experienced by African American people. However, like Donna 
Haraway’s cyborgs that break down gendered and human-robot boundaries (Haraway 1991: 
150-1), Dick’s androids break down boundaries between the races. Haunted by their 
proximity to but also their distance from humans, they are harbingers of a new, integrated 
future. 
 
Dick and Civil Rights in the 1960s 
Dick wrote the novel in one of his fevered rushes during 1966 while living in San Rafael, 
Marin County, fifteen miles north of San Francisco (A. Dick 1995: 132; Sutin 1994: 149, 
307). It is inconceivable that Dick would have been ignorant of the contemporaneous African 
American civil rights movement. Two years earlier, in ‘Nazism and the High Castle’ (1964), 
he had written of the men who bombed the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, 
Alabama, which left the fourteen-year-olds Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley and Carole 
Robertson, and the eleven-year-old Carol Denise McNair dead: ‘If we, you and I, could catch 
the white bastards – or rather just plain bastards – who did it, we would work just as much 
and quick vengeance on them as any Negro mob would or could’ (Dick 1995: 116). Dick’s 
use of the superannuated word ‘Negro’ firmly positions him within the liberal racial ideology 
of the early- and mid-1960s, backed up with his then wife’s insistence that he nominated 
Martin Luther King as a write-in candidate for the 1960 presidential election (A. Dick 1995: 
62, 67). 
The broad contours of the civil rights movement are familiar enough not to need 
recapitulation here. Three key issues are germane to Androids, however. First, following the 
massive gains of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, civil rights 
activists increasingly turned their focus to issues beyond the legal segregation of African 
American citizens. The Watts Rebellion of August 1965 focused the nation’s minds on the 
failures of civil rights legislation to alleviate the poverty, social exclusion and other ills that 
faced inner-city residents. It was followed by a major campaign by King and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to protest urban housing and employment 
discrimination. This placed the focus of civil rights activism on northern urban centres, 
encouraging white residents of these areas to stop considering racism as purely a southern 
phenomenon and prepare themselves to integrate. Second, Malcolm X’s assassination in 
February 1965 and a major civil rights campaign in Alabama during summer 1966 brought 
Black Power to the nation’s attention. Soon afterward, the Black Panther Party formed in 
Oakland and began to garner attention. Black Power activists offered a sterner vision of white 
America’s failings than King and the SCLC. Following Malcolm X, they were less likely to 
advocate non-violence as a core strategy and instead asserted their rights to self-defence in 
order to protect themselves from white violence. This more assertive stance unsettled white 
liberals (see, for example, Roberts 1966). The national prominence of the Alabama Governor, 
George Wallace, forms the third issue. His ability to tap into many white Americans’ sense of 
betrayal was rooted in racism and the seething resentment of whites towards the fact that 
black Americans were moving beyond the ghettos into ‘white’ streets, schools and 
neighbourhoods. He appealed to Americans who lived close to the inner cities, on 
integration’s frontline. Such whites felt threatened by open housing, and thought that an 
influx of black neighbours would debase the neighbourhood and depress housing prices 
(Carter 1995: 208-15). In September 1966, soon after Dick completed Androids, these 
influences coalesced. Police officer Alvin Johnson shot a teenager, Matthew Johnson, in 
Hunters Point, San Francisco’s predominantly African American area, killing him. Local 
residents expressed their anger over subsequent days, damaging property, looting and 
injuring various people in the surrounding area. Officer Johnson was never prosecuted (Agee 
2014: 169-71). 
Preoccupied with the Vietnam War, Dick recalled that in 1966 he was ‘revolutionary 
and existential enough to believe that these android personalities were so lethal, so dangerous 
to human beings, that it ultimately might be necessary to fight them. The problem in killing 
them would then be: “Would we not become like the androids in our very effort to wipe them 
out?”’ (qtd Sammon 1996: 16-17). Whilst Dick’s opinion superficially presents Androids as 
an anti-war statement, beneath this lies a more profound engagement with race. As the Black 
Panther Party noted soon after Dick completed his novel, white racism was at the heart of the 
Vietnam War; white America treated both the Vietnamese and black Americans as second-
class humans, ripe for exploitation or destruction (Anon 1967: 3). Yet the mere fact that he 
lived during a period of racial tumult, both locally and nationally, should lead readers to 
wonder about the extent to which such events fed his unconscious imagination. As Fredric 
Jameson suggests, writers often express the inexpressible using aesthetic methods such as 
science fiction (Buchanan 2006: 16-17); the same might be said of the relationship between 
their unconscious and their work. 
Due to their mass production, the androids appear interchangeable to the humans. 
Once they become aware of the androids’ origins, they tend to measure them against what it 
means to be human, which is to say, a predominantly white, male, heterosexual conception of 
humanity. On Earth, the androids are not even elevated to second-class citizen status, and are 
beneath even sub-optimal humans such as J.R. Isidore: ‘we’re not even considered animals 
[…] every worm and wood louse is considered more desirable’ (Dick 1999: 105). The 
othering of the androids serves to unify human society against them: even Isidore comes to 
side with his material oppressors, even though Deckard represents but one arm of a vestigial 
society that denigrates him as a so-called ‘chickenhead’. Isidore’s circumstances echo those 
of poor whites in the antebellum period, encouraged by an appeal to shared phenotypes to 
defend a social, legal and political apparatus that did little to benefit their material condition. 
The androids occupy a liminal position on Earth, both visibly ‘alive’ and politically 
and legally ‘dead,’ because they are not an official form of life. This renders their existence 
akin to that of African Americans, who lived in a white supremacist society reliant on a 
heavily policed division between white and black. In order to reinforce a psychological 
distancing from his task, Deckard and his fellow humans talk of ‘retiring’ androids rather 
than killing them. Because their lives comprise only work, their retirement equals death; yet 
as not-quite-humans who do not ‘live,’ they cannot ‘die’. This opens up a moral ambiguity 
that firmly indicts the reader in reconfiguring the white hero of the novel’s killing spree as a 
peaceful ushering towards a relaxing superannuation. Deckard, like the vast majority of white 
murderers of African Americans, may kill freely without fear of punishment. His state-
sanctioned, religiously approved power over life and death renders him an embodiment of 
what Achille Mbembe terms ‘necropolitics’: he possesses the ability to define who lives and 
who dies as the ultimate expression of sovereignty (Mbembe 2003). 
  
Slave Insurrections and the Android Nat Turner 
Dick’s racializing of Baty as a brutal Mongolian, coupled with his leadership of a murderous 
group of mutineers, encourages the reader to engage in a form of racial profiling, further 
cementing him as a threat to white society. His is a racialized condition, one that maps the 
policing of racial identity (in the world of the reader) onto political and philosophical 
conceptions of life itself (in the storyworld of the novel). 
Since Baty is the leader of a revolutionary group and an escaped slave, comparisons 
with a series of African American leaders are unavoidable. Most obviously, Baty is 
suggestive of Malcolm X. In his willingness to use violence in order to protect himself and 
his comrades, Baty reflects Malcolm X’s insistence on the right to self-defence. Like 
Malcolm X, he possesses a single-minded focus on android (black) life, even if it leads to an 
indifference towards human (white) life. On a more philosophical level, Baty’s worldview 
reflects one of the key ambitions of African American activists of the 1960s: to convince 
white America of their shared humanity. Civil rights protesters were encouraged to look 
assailants in the eye should they find themselves under physical attack from segregationists, a 
tactic designed to force the racists to accept the protesters’ humanity (see, for example, 
Hogan 2007). Baty’s leadership of the androids is predicated on similar grounds: by entering 
the home of (white) humanity, they assert their right to life rather than mindless automata or 
second-class citizens. As important, each look Deckard directly in the eye before he kills 
them. Yet this notion of android humanity is always precarious. Their occupation of a liminal 
life – almost but not quite human, subject to but not protected by human laws, given 
memories of an early life but not physically born – exacerbates this precarity. As Deckard’s 
occupation reveals, they are subject to extrajudicial death at the hands of a human who will 
suffer no consequences for they exist outside the political sphere.  
At a deeper historical level, Deckard himself identifies Baty in terms associated with 
slavery. Reading his case record, he notes Baty’s occupation: a pharmacist. Deckard finds 
this unlikely, surmising that somebody as powerful as Baty was much more likely to be a 
‘field hand’ who dreamed of a ‘better life, without servitude’ (Dick 1999: 157-8). Baty, then, 
recalls Nat Turner, who led a slave revolt in Virginia during 1831, thus embodying white 
fears of the black male revolutionary. Turner claimed to have had visions of the world before 
he was born and that he knew he was destined for greatness from an early age. ‘Wrapp[ing 
him]self in mystery’ (Turner 1831), he professed to periodic visions of God’s spirit urging 
him towards his destiny as a revolutionary leader in a coming war for the soul of America. 
His Confessions, dictated to the white attorney Thomas Gray, presented the revolutionary as a 
multifaceted ‘griot […] orator, folklorist, preacher, and militant’ (qtd Bernier 2012: 106). 
Even the nineteenth-century white historian William Drewry commented on Turner’s 
‘considerable mental ability and wide information,’ suggesting that his intelligence was as 
significant as his mysticism (95). Like Turner, Baty gathers a group of slaves, kills some 
settlers and escapes their plantation. Similarly, he has ‘mystical preoccupations,’ and 
according to his police file, an ideology centred on ‘the sacredness of so-called android 
“life”’ (Dick 1999: 157-8). He becomes adroit at turning the violence he experienced as a 
slave onto his oppressors, and like Turner, possesses an uncannily powerful intelligence. 
Although identified as East Asian, Baty’s features are not clearly described; like Turner, his 
face remains mysterious, ambiguous; even unknowable. Both embody a new model of (black) 
humanity that (white) humans are unable to comprehend, let alone condone.  
Like Turner though, Baty fails but his attempted insurrection exposes the racist 
structures of (white) human society. Consequently, even though he leads a group of only 
eight, and will expire within only four years of his construction, Baty must be executed as 
quickly and as covertly as possible. Androids’ policing draws on long-term trends in white 
responses to African American resistance and power. As Steve Martinot and Jared Sexton 
observe, ‘the foundations of US white supremacy are far from stable. Owing to the instability 
of white supremacy, the social structures of whiteness must ever be re-secured in an 
obsessive fashion’ (Martinot and Sexton 2003: 179). Read this way, Deckard can only be 
viewed as a slave-catcher, although Dick invites his readers to identify and sympathize with 
him despite his ennui, cynicism and rampant consumerism. The (white) reader’s 
identification with Deckard works to indict him/her in supporting the ethnic cleansing of the 
androids, of a campaign designed to rid society of folks unlike themselves. The novel thus 
challenges its readership’s preconceptions of integration, racism and race. 
 
Android Humanity and ‘Passing’ 
The androids’ attempts to blend into white society add a further dimension to the novel’s 
racial subtext. Taking advantage of their phenotypes, they attempt to ‘pass’ as human on 
Earth, befriending Isidore and taking on regular jobs. ‘Passing’ was a late nineteenth/early 
twentieth-century tactic in which light-skinned black men and women attempted to blend into 
white US society, a place where white people were not judged by their skin colour but rather 
by the content of their character, achievements and intelligence. In many ways, passing 
constituted an attempt by people whose humanity was denied to appropriate their own human 
right via a public performance of whiteness. As Werner Sollors points out, in segregated 
America, passing was considered a threat to social order, not least because those who passed 
destroyed any notion that race had any biological meaning (Sollors 1997: 247-55). 
On Mars, the androids are a slave population. Their ability to respond to humans as if 
they were themselves human is a major asset, enabling a human settler to settle into a life far 
away from Earth, whilst also ensuring their continued subjugation. Their life spans are kept 
short for two reasons: first, to manufacture demand for new product and keep the Rosen 
Corporation profitable, which is so enmeshed in the colonization project that the fate of one is 
dependent upon the other. Second, their short lives theoretically ensure that they don’t learn 
enough self-awareness and cunning in order to resist their servitude. In practice though, the 
androids suffer very real human emotions such as loneliness (Dick 1999: 128). Their quest 
for freedom is also a quest for real, meaningful contact amid their growing awareness of the 
artificiality and meaninglessness of their lives. Thus, even as their experiences make them 
more human as they age, they remain haunted by their artificial conception and the 
knowledge that any skills they possess are programmed rather than acquired: hence their 
preparedness to risk early termination in order to pass as human. 
This is heartbreakingly detailed in the fate of Luba Luft who uses her vocal skills to 
become a German opera singer. Before meeting her, Deckard boasts to himself that his 
appreciation of opera elevates him above his colleagues. A rehearsal of The Magic Flute 
moves him to tears before he reflects on an android becoming the opera’s Pamina, the 
daughter of the Queen of the Night whose union with the opera’s hero, Tamino, heralds a 
new age of harmony: ‘A little ironic, the sentiment her role calls for. However vital, active, 
and nice-looking, an escaped android could hardly tell the truth’ (84). Even though Deckard 
knows Luft is a fake human, his affect – dictated by his eyes and ears – initially overwhelms 
his cognizance. Such a response, acknowledging the emotions generated by her singing while 
remaining steadfast on her inferiority, echoes the white response to another arena in which 
African Americans were implicitly encouraged to demonstrate their humanity: popular song 
(Hall 1992: 27). This expression, however, surely converted some listeners’ attitudes, as the 
former slave Frederick Douglass noted: ‘I have sometimes thought that the mere hearing of 
those [slave] songs would do more to impress some minds with the horrible character of 
slavery, than the reading of whole volumes of philosophy on the subject could do’ (Douglass 
1997: 18-19). Only Deckard’s prior awareness of Luft’s android status prevents him making a 
similar acceptance. Without it, her singing voice would have enabled her to pass as human. 
After escaping from Deckard, Luft heads to a museum, where she is apprehended at 
an Edvard Munch exhibition. Deckard and his temporary companion, Phil Resch, ponder 
Munch’s The Scream (1893), with Resch observing that an android must feel a little of the 
existential horror of the painting’s subject. As an expressionist painter, however, Munch 
suggests that the entire world is saturated with the emotions of the subject. Resch fails to 
comprehend the significance of Munch’s artwork: the protagonist’s horror overcomes the 
entire world. In this, the painting operates metonymically, as a reflection of the androids’ 
lives and of their threat to Earth society should they remain. Deckard and Resch apprehend 
Luft in front of Puberty (1894), another Munchian investigation into the anxiety inherent in 
human existence. Like the painting’s subject, Luft is exposed to the male gaze, fragile and 
defenceless, the shadow of death looming over her. She requests a copy of the painting: 
another signifier of her developing humanity. Her identification with Munch’s dread is at 
once a reminder that her whole existence is dictated by her status as homo sacer, and an 
articulation of her humanity, since she desires a permanent reminder of an artwork that 
possesses emotional resonance. Yet, adding to the sad irony and pathos of this moment, 
everybody knows that this is a copy, albeit one that, unlike the android simulacra, is based on 
a real original. Significantly, Resch kills Luft soon after Deckard gifts her a book of Munch’s 
collected works in a gesture of kindness and empathy that Resch cannot comprehend. She 
dies screaming, reminding Deckard of Munch’s masterpiece, and readers of Munch’s 
suggestion that the individual’s internal horror will poison the rest of the world. 
Before her death, Luft goads Resch, angrily lamenting that she spent her entire time 
on Earth ‘imitating the human […] acting as if I had the thoughts and impulses a human 
would have. Imitating, as far as I’m concerned, a superior life form’ (Dick 1999: 115). Here 
she touches on one of the core psychological problems of the person who passes. The entire 
process is predicated on the overarching assertion of the equality of black and white within a 
world that insists on the inferiority of the former (the identity given to them) and the 
superiority of latter (the identity they adopt). Such a complex psychological state inevitably 
creates its own burdens, which partially explains why so many androids meet their fate with 
resignation and relief. Luft’s lament, however, reflects debates within the civil rights 
movement, namely whether its strategy should be to integrate into (white) America or move 
along its own path, aware that they would be integrating, as James Boggs wrote in 1969, into 
a ‘burning house’ (Boggs 2011: 207). The increasingly blurred boundaries between human 
and android (white and black) – a consequence of the Rosen Corporation’s fidelity to 
capitalist impulses without regard to the human consequences – render her murder essential, 
even though Deckard complains, ‘I don’t get it; how can a talent like that be a liability to our 
society?’ […] She was a wonderful singer. The planet could have used her. This is insane’ 
(Dick 1999: 117). 
 
Race and Affect in the Voigt-Kampff Test 
As Deckard tells Resch, the Voigt-Kampff test – the method for determining android from 
human – relies on unconscious human responses to provocative stimuli: ‘Reaction time is a 
factor’ (120). The testing equipment senses the speed of capillary dilation on the face – in 
simple terms, blushing – a reaction that cannot be controlled consciously. Android 
technology has not yet matched the speed of this affective response; the gap between human 
(unconscious) and android (conscious) reactions enables Deckard to differentiate between the 
two. In this, Dick anticipates the affective turn that accompanied neoliberalism: the neoliberal 
subject must not only think, it must feel (Gill and Kanai 2018: 320-1). Suffering from a 
‘flattening of affect’ (Dick 1999: 33), the androids cannot emote quickly enough to be 
considered human; they are thus relegated to the status of disposable workers for neoliberal 
capitalism. Affect thus elevates the human above the slave, and offers the potential for a life 
without work; meanwhile the slave’s failure to match their epistemological understanding of 
experience with an ontological feeling supposedly demonstrates their inhumanity. They 
might consider themselves human but their delayed feelings betray them. Conversely, to 
Deckard, they might appear human but the Voigt-Kampff test gives him the intellectual 
awareness that they are not. 
However, as the death of George Floyd has confirmed, police officers reflect the 
tendency of white people to see black faces through racist prisms, including misidentifying 
items held in their hands as weapons. This is particularly prevalent when they only have a 
short period of time in which to make the decision (see, for example, Payne et al 2002). This 
inability to comprehend the outward display of android (black) emotions necessitates a 
technological solution in order to police the boundary between human (white) and android 
(black). The Voigt-Kampff test thus racializes its subjects, affording the bounty hunters the 
power to classify (racial) categories and determine who is criminal simply through the terms 
of their existence: ‘blackness has become an ontological crime, a crime of being’ (Torres et al 
2017: 1120). The bounty hunter determines the boundaries between the races including the 
potential for accidentally, or indeed deliberately, exterminating those considered sub-
standard. Earth’s population must therefore trust in the incorruptibility of the bounty hunter, 
and his willingness to subsume his subjectivity within the test’s objective findings about the 
androids’ subjective responses. 
As Douglass bitterly noted, slave-owners became excellent students of human nature:  
They have to deal not with earth, wood, or stone, but with men; and, by every 
regard they have for their safety and prosperity, they must study to know the 
material on which they are to work. So much intellect as the slaveholder has 
around him, requires watching. Their safety depends upon their vigilance […] 
They watch, therefore, with skilled and practiced eyes, and have learned to 
read, with great accuracy, the state of mind and heart of the slave, through his 
sable face. (Douglass 2003: 202)  
Douglass thus reminds us of the slave-owners’ tacit acceptance of their chattel’s humanity 
even as they denied it to them through the institution of slavery. This knowledge of the 
slaves’ human nature was essential in the pursuit of escapees, and similarly implied 
acceptance of the slaves as human beings. In the novel, without the ability to ‘read’ android 
faces, bounty hunters must rely on the test in order to understand the inner life of the android. 
As important, Deckard must appreciate the humanity of the androids in order to track them 
successfully; hence, his success connotes acceptance of their human qualities irrespective of 
the test’s findings. 
Resch suggests to Deckard that he cauterize his burgeoning empathy for androids by 
sleeping with Rachael Rosen, mistaking this empathy for mere lust. His updating of the 
callous attitude towards female slaves by white male owners, who would use their power to 
rape with impunity and treat such assaults as a perk of ownership, leads Deckard only to 
wonder if Resch is the more effective bounty hunter. Following Resch’s urging, Deckard 
manufactures a situation in which he and Rachael might have sex, despite such congress 
being illegal. Deckard’s mastery though, indicated by his objectification of Rachael’s 
physical appearance, is countered by her sexual agency, in which she orders him to bed. It 
transpires that Rachael has been programmed to seduce the bounty hunters, prompting 
enough psychological torment that they are unable to kill the androids before being killed 
themselves (Resch being the sole exception). In advising Deckard not to consider his actions, 
Rachael performs another act of passing, encouraging him to rely on only his senses: she 
looks, sounds and feels human; only his intellectual awareness of her fabrication prevents 
him accepting her as such. Rachael not only imitates the human but also prompts the human 
to accept this imitation, reiterating the novel’s suggestion that feeling is superior to thinking. 
Numerous problems emerge here, not least the racist assumption of black hyper-sexuality and 
the allusion to the anti-miscegenation laws that were designed as a ‘founding gesture of 
whiteness’ and a component feature of white supremacist dialogue (Sexton 2003: 246). 
In transgressing this boundary, however, Deckard is not merely breaking down 
human-android barriers or, in dialectical terms, creating a new synthesis of human-android. 
As these episodes suggest, the androids’ passing proves profoundly destabilizing for 
Deckard, charged as he is with defending the (racial) purity of humanity. It reinforces the 
novel’s irony in that what made the androids so successful necessitates their ultimate 
destruction. This irony is intensified by Deckard’s increasing awareness that the process of 
hunting fundamentally alters the androids’ behaviour, much like George Zimmerman’s 
stalking of Trayvon Martin prompted an entirely understandable response that Zimmerman 
used as a pretext for killing the younger man (Torres et al 2017: 1117-19). The androids 
exhibit a painfully natural, flight-or-flight response to their predicament. So, even as the 
Voigt-Kampff test supposedly reveals their lack of humanity, their very humane response to 
the existential threat to their own lives undermines the test’s findings. They might not possess 
true empathy for living beings but their behaviour is ultimately very human. 
 
The Spatial Androids 
Reading the androids as slaves also begs consideration of the novel’s relationship with 
colonialism and the concept of physical space. This adds extra depth to the novel, first in 
terms of the imperial relationship between Earth and Mars, and second in its presentation of 
the frontline of integration between these two locations. These spaces have been produced by 
social and political action; the former in the novel’s diegetic world and the latter both in 
Androids and Dick’s real-life world. In transgressing the boundaries between the imperial 
centre and the periphery, the androids threaten to bring Mars’s social structure (defined by 
slavery) to Earth, forcing its residents to come to terms with the moral and ethical 
implications of the imperialist-capitalist project.  
As important, the San Francisco of the novel is much like the San Francisco of 1966, 
facing integration at the hands of agents who have no faith in the willingness of the current 
residents to comply. As Luft suggests, Baty’s group is not concerned with destroying human 
society as they see it. Instead, they merely want to fit into Earth life before they expire. Their 
destruction serves as a powerful reminder of white American attitudes towards integration, 
echoing the violence meted out to civil rights marchers in Chicago during 1966 or George 
Wallace’s promise to bring Alabama law to the nation and put ‘a bullet in the brain’ of 
anybody prepared to engage in urban unrest (Carter 1995: 367). The novel thus reflects the 
fears of many northern whites who saw the Watts Rebellion symbolically bring the racial 
violence and strife of the civil rights movement into northern urban centres.  
Yet these were not generalized fears. In 1963, soon after 30,000 people marched 
through San Francisco to declare their support for civil rights, James Baldwin visited to film a 
documentary about the city’s racial tinderbox. First broadcast on February 4, 1964, Take This 
Hammer included a series of discussions between Baldwin, his hosts and residents of the 
predominantly African American Bayview-Hunters Point area. The local activist Orville 
Luster stated that African American San Franciscans were ‘trying to find [their] place… This 
is one of the problems… What place is there for me?’: a statement that Dick’s androids might 
themselves have made. Meanwhile, one resident put his fellow San Franciscans’ situation in 
starker terms by suggesting that only violent revolution could bring change: ‘Let everybody 
bleed a bit.’ 
Deckard, meanwhile, is told by a fellow bounty hunter that ‘we stand between the 
Nexus-6 and mankind, a barrier which keeps the two distinct’ (Dick 1999: 121). His role in 
policing this frontline of integration is to confront (black) androids heading into (white) 
northern urban centres, and in line with the prevailing sociological assumptions, prevent them 
degrading white society. Detaching himself from his emotions, he objectifies the androids, 
focusing on their crimes and failure to empathize with living beings, rather than the potential 
that these crimes constituted the agonized last resort of an oppressed race. Read alongside the 
extra-legal killing of Matthew Johnson, this again racializes the androids, reminding readers 
of the dehumanization central to American policing of the inner cities.  
Androids’s spatial qualities manifest themselves best in its treatment of an android 
ghetto within San Francisco and its representation of suburbia. This ghetto exists in an 
anomalous space: ‘a closed loop, cut off from the rest of San Francisco. We know about them 
but they don’t know about us’ (106). Notwithstanding the practical questions generated by 
the ghetto’s existence, it symbolically parallels the physically and psychologically excluded 
Bayview-Hunters Point. Bounded by Highways 101 and 280, Bayview-Hunters Point was 
dominated by shipyards until deindustrialization took hold after World War II. Federal policy 
facilitated white flight from the area, which was roughly balanced between black and white 
residents in 1960, but became almost 75% African American by the end of the decade, with 
an unemployment rate three times higher than the wider Bay Area. During the mid-1960s, 
‘dominant representations of Bayview-Hunters Point, in official reports, news media and 
popular culture, depicted the area as isolated from the rest of the city, not as a result of 
economic or political inequalities as Bayview activists were arguing, but due to its perceived 
cultural and racial difference’ (Dillon 2011: 18; emphasis added). Such representations 
posited a close relationship between the area’s social problems and the race of its residents, 
othering and objectifying black San Franciscans because they supposedly lacked the moral 
and social qualities of white Americans. This reinforced both the isolation of Bayview-
Hunters Point that Baldwin observed and the refusal of whites to acknowledge the existence, 
let alone the humanity, of their fellow residents.  
Consequently, Deckard’s surprise at discovering this ghetto reflects that of many San 
Franciscans who watched Take This Hammer or who remained ignorant of black San 
Francisco until the Hunters Point uprising. Analogous to real-life suburbanites, Deckard 
robotically drives his (hover)car into the city, heads home exhausted at day’s end, while his 
wife’s social isolation is alleviated only by the opiates of the novel’s ersatz religion, 
Mercerism, and a mood manipulation organ. Like all the remaining humans, they 
compulsively watch Buster Friendly, the one surviving TV programme that acts as a further 
reminder of their uniformity, meaninglessness and failure to escape. Deckard envies the 
riches that come to his immediate superior, who lives in an upscale area of San Francisco, 
and casts envious eyes at his neighbour’s horse, much like 1960s suburban men might covet a 
new car. Eternally desirous of a real animal to supplant their electric sheep, the pair are 
caught in the ‘bland ritual of competitive spending’ (Mumford 1961: 494), facilitated only by 
Deckard’s skill at killing androids. Yet Deckard’s occupation itself thwarts their greatest 
desire – that of escape to Mars – and thus ironically binds them to their unfulfilling suburban 
life; indeed, their consumerist ecstasy comes to an abrupt end when they comprehend the 
burden of the repayment schedule.  
In 1960s America, suburbia represented a location for middle-class whites to group 
together, a place to reassert individual property rights, privacy and the right not to engage 
with social undesirables, notably the poor and the black. The Baty group hides in a suburban 
building that, due to radioactivity, has been abandoned by all its human inhabitants except 
Isidore. The impact of this plot development operates primarily at a non-diegetic level. Thus, 
this depopulated suburbia of the future is metonymically the suburbia of the 1960s, integrated 
by a group of (black) sub-humans; the androids’ invasion is hugely disturbing because it 
constitutes a subversion of and challenge to suburbia’s homogeneity, demolishing the 
physical, economic and psychological barriers established by suburbanites to separate 
themselves from the urban world that they wished to leave behind. 
As a private space, Isidore’s building occupies an even more problematic position 
than public spaces in terms of the androids’ incursion into white society. As civil rights 
activists discovered, desegregating public accommodations involved major struggles at 
national, local and state levels; desegregating housing proved even more difficult (see, for 
example, Cook 1998). The ease with which the androids insert themselves into a private 
housing development, meanwhile, portends wider patterns of integration. The androids even 
threaten a further, double transgression. In setting up camp in Isidore’s conapt, they recreate a 
family unit. Baty is the masculine head of the household; Irmgard very much plays his wife. 
Pris, meanwhile, acts like a curious and unworldly daughter in her attempts to manipulate 
Isidore. While Isidore accepts them into his house, he is clearly the junior partner: the 
androids have adopted him. Deckard must ensure that this nuclear family never settles into 
domestic life; that a (white) human never becomes subordinate to a (black) android, let alone 
be ‘adopted’ by a (black) android family. Deckard must consequently reassert (white) human 
superiority by destroying an incipient integrated family. 
Yet, ironically, the androids find suburbia a suffocating trap. The places where the 
androids search for freedom in fact become their coffins: Garland is killed at work; Luft in 
the museum where she seeks succour; Polokov on his apartment roof; and the others in their 
suburban refuge. As sub-humans, their privacy rights do not exist; as terrorists, they must be 
destroyed. Their attempt to become suburbanites fails due to the panoptic surveillance and 
overwhelming power of white supremacy. What began as a new way of life, freed from the 
drudgery of work, became a fight to the death. Lewis Mumford’s argument that the suburbs 
constituted ‘what was properly a beginning was treated as an end’ never appears as poignant 
as when applied to the androids (Mumford 1961: 494).  
 
The Final Reckoning 
As ever, Dick has a final trick up his sleeve. Luft upbraids Deckard for his failure to betray 
any emotion at her impending demise. Logically, she argues, this lack of empathy for another 
living being suggests that he is an android himself. Taken aback at this extraordinary 
assertion of android humanity, Deckard descends into an existential crisis. He eventually 
concludes that the androids possess the right to life, a decision that confirms the 
meaninglessness of his job. He understands that, as living beings, the androids were 
compelled to escape Mars and belatedly embraces Isidore’s willingness to accept the androids 
as humans and openness to their plight, despite their (computer-driven) flaws. After all, any 
enslaved human would wish to do the same.  
When told that they took ‘unlawful flight,’ he thinks to himself: ‘To save their lives’ 
(Dick 1999: 151). He eventually accepts that Baty led the androids to Earth because, like him, 
they had dreams of the future. He realizes that his job ‘require[s him] to violate his own 
identity’ and that he must reach out to other beings in order to become truly empathetic (152). 
Deckard concludes that his success in killing all the androids is a defeat, which prompts him 
to declare his retirement amid the triumph of his anomie: ‘Where I go the ancient curse 
follows […] I am required to do wrong’ (193-4). 
Deckard experiences a final revelation when he heads into the Oregon wastelands, far 
away from the integrating city. Buster Friendly has revealed that Mercerism is a swindle, 
symbolically shattering the boundaries between human and android. Deckard needs the 
distance from the troubles to accept this new future and come to an appreciation that all living 
beings possess a soul. Sleep-deprived, he thinks he has become Mercer and believes that he 
has found a live toad, despite knowing that they became extinct years ago. Even his wife’s 
discovery that it is indeed a fake fails to thwart his devotion to it, and this to a new 
understanding of humanity: ‘The electric things have their lives, too’ (208).  
Dick’s novel ends on this transcendent note: even artificial life is life itself. A racial 
reading of Androids similarly prompts readers to accept African American equality and worry 
less about the impact that integration might have on their lives than the impact their racism 
might have on themselves and the world around them. Baty and his friends have essentially 
sacrificed themselves in order to bring about a new post-human (or post-racial) era. This 
racial reading therefore intensifies one of Dick’s signature themes – the nature of humanity – 
to the extent that the novel becomes more humanist even as it anticipates a post-human 
future. At the political level, it reveals the psychological damage that racial categorization 
does both to the oppressor and the oppressed, suggesting at its end that a race war offers no 
true resolution: only accepting human equality will enable white Americans to sleep 
peacefully. It is as if Dick echoes Baldwin in revealing that, by degrading the androids, 
humans succeed only in debasing themselves; that Deckard – and hence all his fellow humans 
– can only liberate themselves by liberating the androids. The androids forced Deckard to 
look them in the eye to prove their humanity, prompting him to look into himself and 
question why he is policing this boundary so violently. By erasing the boundaries between 
slavery and freedom, and by confronting (white) human supremacy at its source, the androids 
fulfil Baldwin’s maxim that ‘the power of the white world is threatened whenever a black 
man refuses to accept the white world’s definitions’ (Baldwin 1998: 326). To paraphrase 
Baldwin, they force Deckard to comprehend that they were not the androids, but him, that the 
boundaries between human and android, black and white, were artificially constructed in 
order to uphold a profoundly inhumane social system. 
 
Note: My profound thanks to Michael J. Collins for his exemplary reading of an earlier draft 
of this article, to John Wills for a hugely insightful reading of a later draft that helped me iron 
out a few problematic sections and of course to Paul March-Russell for his excellent editorial 
hand and infinite patience. 
 
Endnote 
1 I use ‘black’ in the sense in that it is a socio-political construct, ‘created as a political 
category in a certain historical moment,’ namely the 1960s. As Stuart Hall remarked to his 
son, ‘I’m not talking about your paintbox, I’m talking about [inside] your head’ (Hall 2019: 
75-6). I flip this to signify that the androids are ‘black’ in other peoples’ heads.  
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